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Abstract— Due to hostile environment and wireless communication channel, security mechanisms are essential for 
wireless sensor networks (WSNs). Existence of a pair of shared key is a prerequisite for many of these security 
mechanisms; a task that key management system addresses. Recently, an energy efficient method based on public key 
cryptography (PKC) was proposed. We analyze this protocol and show that it is vulnerable to denial of service (DOS) 
attacks and adversary can exhaust memory and battery of nodes. Then, we analyze this protocol and show that using a 
more knowledgeable BS this vulnerability can be solved very efficiently. Based on this observation we propose a modified 
version of the protocol that achieves immediate authentication and can prevent DOS attacks. We show that the improved 
protocol achieves immediate authentication at the expense of 1.82 mj extra energy consumption while retaining other 
desirable characteristics of the basic method.1 
Keywords— key management system; public key cryptography; denial of service; broadcast authentication 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 Wireless sensor Network (WSN) is a collection of large number of low-power sensor actuator nodes and its main objective is to 
serve as an interface to the real world for gathering physical information such as temperature, light, radiation, etc. Nodes perform 
some preliminary processing on gathered data and then send them back to a sink node for final processing. These networks are 
specialized in their nature, and they are decentralized and self-organized; therefore, they can be deployed without requiring the 
existence of a supporting infrastructure [1]. Another characteristic of these networks is that their topology is unknown a priori, so 
an airplane or artillery could deploy them to unreachable regions [2]. These unique features have led to wide range of applications 
for these networks. Healthcare monitoring, protection of critical infrastructures, monitoring environment for seismic sensing, flood 
and volcanic monitoring, military target tracking, and surveillance are just a few applications for these networks. 
 WSNs rely on wireless connectivity and usually they are unattended and without physical protections. These characteristics 
make them susceptible to different types of attacks. Furthermore, many applications of WSNs require secure communications. 
Also, the same unique features and characteristics that have promised such a broad range of applications for WSNs have rendered 
protocols of traditional wireless networks useless. So, new security protocols are needed for these networks. Key management as 
the integral part of any secure communications is not an exception and it needs even more attention. Recently, many key 
management schemes based on symmetric primitives have been proposed for wireless sensor networks [3, 4]. These methods have 
very low energy demands and they are fit for tight constraints on nodes’ resources, but unfortunately they cannot provide prefect 
resiliency. Because WSNs are unattended and sometimes they are deployed in hostile environments, adversary could capture nodes. 
Also, these networks have lots of nodes. In order to keep them affordable, nodes cannot be equipped with tamper proof mechanism. 
All in all, adversary can collect nodes and read their information (including their cryptographic keys). So adversary can easily 
mount a cloning attack [5]. Therefore, a suitable key management system should be as resilient as possible.  
 Critical applications need perfect resiliency and PKC-based key management systems can provide it. Also, in PKC-based 
systems all the keys are unique and therefore detection of cloning attack would be easier. Previous studies [6, 7] have shown 
applicability of PKC for these networks. For example, verification of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) signature with 160-bits 
key takes 1.61s on ATmegal28, and it consumes 45.09mj energy. More recent studies have reduced this energy consumption. For 
example, Imote2 which is equipped with ultralow power processor consumes only 3.51mj for the same task [8].  
 Following these incipient works, different PKC based systems were proposed for WSNs. First, an authentication protocol based 
on RSA and ECC was presented [9]. Later studies demonstrated vulnerability of this protocol to masquerade attack [10]. Later, Ren 
et al. proposed two different broadcast authentication methods. The first method was based on ECC and Merkle hash tree and the 
other one was based on Hess identity based signature [11]. Another identity-based authentication scheme reduced energy 
consumption of authentication [12]. Shim et al. further reduced energy consumption of identity-based authentication. This was 
achieved by using a pairing-optimal identity based system with message recovery method [13]. Another work employed Rabin-
Williams signature for authenticating code dissemination [14].  
 Other researchers replaced checking authenticity of public keys with other low-cost operations. First, bloom filter and Merkle 
hash tree were used for this purpose [15]. Liu et al. used ECC and hash function and proposed another low-cost method for 
authenticating broadcast messages [16]. Recently, another method named broadcast authenticated PKC (BA) was proposed [17]. In 
this method, digital certificates were replaced with one-time-signatures based on delayed broadcasted messages from base station 
(BS). The method was three times more energy-efficient than certificate-based key management systems.  
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 This paper presents a new set of analysis on BA protocol. First, we analyze BA protocol and show that delayed authentication 
of BS messages opens doors for serious denial of service attacks. To that end, we present a set of simulations and show that 
adversary can flood network with bogus messages. In this manner, he can exhaust memory of nodes. Also, adversary can force 
nodes of network to re-transmit its bogus messages. This could lead to severe energy exhaustion attack which is very serious in 
WSNs. Finally, we present a novel method based on hash operation and solve these problems while retaining other desirable 
characteristics of BA method.  
 The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents a brief overview of BA method and investigates its 
vulnerabilities to DOS attacks. Proposed method is presented in section III.  Analysis of the proposed method follows in section IV. 
Finally the paper concludes is section V. 
II. BA METHOD AND ITS VULNERABILITY TO DOS ATTACKS 
Table I describes notations used in the rest of this paper. 
 
A. Broadcast-Authenticated (BA) method 
 Crudely, broadcast authenticated (BA) method relies on a set of one-time signatures generated by BS. These signatures are 
generated with a message authentication code (MAC), a chain of keys ({KDSi}), and public keys (Pux). Then, nodes are preloaded 
with their credentials. After nodes are deployed in the target field, they broadcast their credentials for their neighbors and wait for 
BS to disclose the symmetric validation key. Finally, nodes use exchanged signatures and validation key and authenticate each 
other.  Details of BA method are as follows. 
 First, BS generates a key chain. This chain is used by nodes for checking authenticity of BS messages. 
1 0 00...Authn Auth Auth AuthK K K K    (1) 
Then, BS generates a second key chain. This chain is used for generating the set of one-time signatures. 
1 0...DSn DS DSK K K   (2) 
Afterwards, BS generates public (Pux) and private (Prx) parameters of elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) for every node. Then, 
BS generates one-time signatures of every node as:  
𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑥𝑖 = 𝑀𝐴𝐶𝐾𝐷𝑆𝑖(𝑃𝑢𝑥)      𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛 (3) 
TABLE I.  NOTATIONS USED IN THIS PAPER 
Notation Meaning 
|| Concatenation 
Pux Public parameter of elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman 
of Node x 
Prx Private parameter of elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman 
of Node x 
i Cycle number 
KDSi Key used to generate ith. signature 
Txi Time measured locally at node x 
Signxi 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑋𝑖 = 𝑀𝐴𝐶𝐾𝐷𝑆𝑖(𝑃𝑢𝑋) 
TicketXi 𝑇𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑋𝑖 = 𝑃𝑢𝑋||𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑋𝑖 
Δi Time difference between two consecutive cycles 
KAuthi Key chain for authenticating BS messages 
MACK(M) Message Authentication Code of message (M) 
using key (K) 
EK(M) Symmetric encryption of message (M) using key 
(K) 
KAB Pairwise key between node A and B 
f,ℊ Some publicly agreed on functions 
h(M) Hash value of message M 
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After nodes have exchanged their signatures, BS discloses KDSi. Then, nodes use MAC and disclosed key for authenticating 
public keys of their neighbours.  Finally shared key is calculated according to Diffie-Hellman scheme. Figure 1 illustrates the 
main steps of this protocol. 
 
       Referring to figure 1, BA method consists of three main phases. First, nodes exchange their credentials with their neighbors. 
Second, BS broadcasts key for checking validity of those credentials (KDSi). Finally, acknowledgment message is exchanged. 
Investigating the second phase of the protocol shows that it needs a mechanism for guarantying its freshness; otherwise adversary 
can replay old messages. The BA method relied on a symmetric primitive for this purpose. Let i and ∆i denote cycle number, and 
time difference between two consecutive cycles. BS uses a symmetric encryption method with KAuthi and broadcasts the following 
message: 
𝐵𝑆 ⟶ 𝑋: 𝐸𝐾𝐴𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑖(𝐾𝐷𝑆𝑖|| 𝑖|| ∆𝑖) (4) 
After t seconds, KAuthi is broadcasted in the network.  
𝐵𝑆 ⟶ 𝑋: 𝐸𝐾𝐴𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑖 (5) 
Now, nodes use KAuthi and decrypt message 4. Then, they use MAC algorithm and check authenticity of public keys of their 
neighbor nodes. Finally, the shared key is generated by running ECDH algorithm.  
B. Vulnerabilities of BA method: 
According to equation 5, authentications of message 4 is delayed for at least t seconds. We show that this delay can open doors 
for DOS attacks. For this purpose, different scenarios were simulated. 
In the BA protocol, authentications of BS messages are delayed. Adversary can exploit this characteristic and flood network 
with fake messages. Because nodes can only distinguish between legitimate and bogus messages after arrival of message 5, they 
have to buffer all received messages. This could exhaust memory of nodes and prevent them from running other tasks. To 
demonstrate effect of this attack we assumed that adversary chooses his time of attacks according to a uniform distribution on the 
interval of [1, τ]. Figure 2 shows amount of exhausted memory for different values of τ.  
 
Apparently, as the value of τ decreases, the amount of exhausted memory increases. 
      Nodes of WSNs have limited transceiver range; thus, these networks rely on intermediate nodes for propagating their messages. 
For example, in the blind flooding, BS messages are re-transmitted by every node of network. In this fashion, messages of BS are 
broadcasted throughout the network. Adversary can exploit both delayed authentication and blind flooding mechanism and mount 
an effective energy exhaustion attack. In other words, nodes cannot authenticate bogus messages immediately. Also, due to blind 
 
Fig. 1. Simple schematic of the BA method 
 
Fig. 2. Exhausted memory of a node 
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flooding mechanism they will re-transmit them for their neighbors. To demonstrate effect of this attack on exhausted energy we 
assumed that adversary picks his time of attack according to a uniform distribution on the interval of [0, 10] minutes. Then, we 
calculated the total amount of energy consumed by network for re-broadcasting these fake messages. Figure 3 shows amount of 
exhausted energy.  
 
According to figure 3 this attack is very devastating, especially for large networks. 
III. PROPOSED METHOD 
Based on discussions of previous section BA method is vulnerable to DOS attacks. In this section we propose a new protocol 
that alleviates those problems.  
Investigating equation 4 shows that it is concatenation of a key, a counter, and cycle duration. Apparently, BS knows values of 
counters and both keys (KDSi, KAuthi) for all cycles. Also, BS is responsible for initiating new authentication cycles; therefore, 
assuming that BS (at least) knows time of next cycle is quite logical. Based on this assumption, BS has the complete knowledge 
about message of next cycle. Therefore, he can exploit this knowledge and append hash value of next message to the current 
message. In this fashion, nodes can use this auxiliary information for immediate authentication of received message. Figure 4 
shows this idea.  
 
Now, we present details of the proposed method. First, instead of message 4, BS broadcasts following message. 
𝐵𝑆
⟶ 𝑋:  𝐸𝐾𝐴𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑖−1(𝐾𝐷𝑆𝑖−1||𝑖
− 1||∆𝑖−1)||𝐸𝐾𝐴𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑖−1(ℎ(𝐸𝐾𝐴𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑖(𝐾𝐷𝑆𝑖|| 𝑖|| ∆𝑖))||𝑖 − 1) 
 
(6) 
 
After nodes receive message 6, they split it into two parts: 
{
𝑀𝑖−1,1 = 𝐸𝐾𝐴𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑖−1(𝐾𝐷𝑆𝑖−1|| 𝑖 − 1|| ∆𝑖−1)             
𝑀𝑖−1,2 = 𝐸𝐾𝐴𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑖−1(ℎ(𝐸𝐾𝐴𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑖(𝐾𝐷𝑆𝑖|| 𝑖|| ∆𝑖))||𝑖 − 1)
 
 
(7) 
 
 
(7) 
5 
 
Fig. 3. Exhausted energy of network 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Appending hash of next message to the current message 
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After disclosure of KAuthi-1 nodes decrypt Mi-1,2 and save value of 𝜇𝑖−1 = ℎ(𝐸𝐾𝐴𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑖(𝐾𝐷𝑆𝑖|| 𝑖|| ∆𝑖)) for the next cycle. In the next 
cycle nodes receive message 8. 
𝐵𝑆 ⟶ 𝑋: 𝑀𝑖,1|| 𝑀𝑖,2 (8) 
Now, nodes immediately check authenticity of message 8 as: 
ℎ(𝑀𝑖,1)
?
=
𝜇𝑖−1 
(9) 
If equation 9 holds, nodes buffer it and wait for BS to reveal KAuthi. After disclosure of this key, every node performs a hash 
operation and checks its authenticity. Also, freshness of message (8) is checked by comparing locally calculated time difference 
with the one sent from BS [19]. Then, nodes use KDSi with MAC operation and check validity of received public keys. Finally, 
nodes run ECDH and extract pairwise keys. The improved protocol with immediate authentication (i-BA protocol) is presented in 
Table II. It is noteworthy that A, B, and X denote two neighbouring nodes and every nodes of network. 
 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED METHODS 
To demonstrate potency of the proposed method different scenarios were simulated with Matlab. In these simulations nodes 
were randomly distributed in a 500×500 meters field. We assumed a homogeneous network with transceivers range of 30 meters. 
Also, the network used packet size of 41 bytes (32 bytes for payload and 9 bytes for header) [18]. Parameters of i-BA were as 
follows. 10 bits for cycle counter, 14 bits for ∆i, 128 bits for MAC and all keys, and 160 bits for ECDH keys. Finally, SHA-1 and 
AES methods were used for symmetric encryptions and hash operations. Each simulation was run for 100 times and then results 
were averaged. 
A. Security analysis 
In the i-BA method message 6 is the main target for adversary. We show that he cannot alter this message or replay it. Both 
parts of message 6 (Mi,1, Mi,2) are encrypted with a secret key and both of them are appended with a counter. If adversary 
manipulates message 6 these counter would decrypt into wrong counter; therefore, nodes will detect that message has been 
tampered.  
The proposed method uses time difference between consecutive cycles. There are three possibilities considering replay of 
message 6.  
1- Replaying message 6 in the same cycle and before disclosure of KAuthi. 
2- Replaying message 6 in another cycle. 
3- Replaying message 6 in the same cycle and after disclosure of KAuthi.  
 In the first case, adversary does not know KAuthi so he can only re-transmit message 6 without its alteration. This is equivalent to 
participation of adversary in the blind flooding and network will benefit from it. In the second case, BS would disclose a different 
KAuth; therefore, decrypting message from an old cycle with this new key will not pass integrity check and nodes will discard it. In 
the third case, adversary should jam target node so that it does not receive KAuthi from BS. Then, he will use disclosed KAuthi and 
will decrypt message 6. He may use this information and generates valid signatures for his nodes. On the other hand, he has to alter 
TABLE II.  𝑖-BA PROTOCOL 
𝑇𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑋𝑖 = [𝑃𝑢𝑋, 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑋𝑖], 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑋𝑖 = 𝑀𝐴𝐶𝐾𝐷𝑆𝑖(𝑃𝑢𝑋) 
∆𝑖= (𝑇𝐵𝑆𝑖 − 𝑇𝐵𝑆𝑖−1) 
𝐴 → 𝐵:  𝑇𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐴𝑖            𝐵 → 𝐴:  𝑇𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐵𝑖                   
𝐵𝑆 ⟶ 𝑋: 𝑀𝑖,1||𝑀𝑖,2            , 𝑇𝐵𝑆 = 𝑇𝐵𝑆𝑖 
X: ℎ(𝑀𝑖,1)
?
=
𝜇𝑖−1 
𝐵𝑆 → 𝑋: 𝐾𝐴𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑖                     , 𝑇𝐵𝑆 = 𝑇𝐵𝑆𝑖 + 𝑡 
𝑋:𝐾𝐴𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑖
ℎ?
→𝐾𝐴𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑖−1  ; 𝑇𝑥𝑖 − 𝑇𝑥𝑖−1
?
≅
∆𝑖   ; 
𝐴: 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝐵𝑖
?
=
𝑀𝐴𝐶𝐾𝐷𝑆𝑖(𝑃𝑢𝐵) 
𝐵: 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝐴𝑖
?
=
𝑀𝐴𝐶𝐾𝐷𝑆𝑖(𝑃𝑢𝐴)  
𝐴: 𝐾𝐴𝐵 = 𝑓(𝑃𝑢𝐵 × 𝑃𝑟𝐴, 𝑖) 
𝐵: 𝐾𝐴𝐵 = 𝑓(𝑃𝑢𝐴 × 𝑃𝑟𝐵, 𝑖) 
𝐴 → 𝐵 ∶ ℊ(𝐾𝐴𝐵) 
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value of ∆𝑖  in the message 6 to ∆𝑖 + 𝑡 so that target node would calculate correct time difference. But, this will contradict integrity 
check of equation 9. So target node will discard this message and prevent the replay attack. 
B. Connectivity of the proposed methods 
The i-BA method assumes that all nodes receive BS messages. Apparently for a BS with a powerful transmitter this 
assumption is correct; thus, the other case is investigated. In this case, nodes retransmit messages of BS for their neighbours.  
 
Theorem1: If k and 𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 denote number of neighbours of node C and probability of packet loss, probability of receiving message 
of BS (pr) satisfies equation 10. 
𝑝𝑟 = 1 − 𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠
𝑘.𝑝𝑟 (10) 
Proof: On average k.pr of neighbours of node C have received message of BS. Thus, probability of node C not receiving message 
of BS is: 
𝑝𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙 = 𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠
𝑘.𝑝𝑟 (11) 
We analyzed number of neighbors in [19]. We showed that if N nodes with transceiver range of r are distributed uniformly over 
a square field of a×a then, on average nodes have 𝑁. 𝐹𝑍(
𝑟
𝑎
) neighbors. Where, FZ is calculated as: 
𝐹𝑍(𝓏) =
{
 
 
 
 
𝜋𝓏2                                                                             𝑐 ∈ 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛   𝐼
𝜋𝓏2 −
𝓏2
2
(𝜃 − 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝜃)                                               𝑐 ∈ 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐼𝐼
𝜋𝓏2 −
𝓏2
2
(𝜃 −
𝑠𝑖𝑛𝜃
2
) −
𝓏2
4
(𝜑 − 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝜑) −                                        
               
𝓏2
2
𝑡𝑎𝑛−1 (cot
𝜃
2
) + 𝓏2𝑐𝑜𝑠
𝜑
2
𝑐𝑜𝑠
𝜃
2
         𝑐 ∈ 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐼𝐼𝐼
(12) 
Also, different regions of network are depicted in figure 5. 
 
Theorem2: If two nodes participate in m authentication cycles, probability of sharing a key in the i-BA method is equal to: 
𝑃𝑚 = 1 − (1 − 𝑝𝑟
4)𝑚 (13) 
Proof: In the i-BA method every node should receive two messages from BS. If nodes receive message of BS with probability of 
pr, then probability of both nodes receiving necessary messages of BS is: 
 
𝑃𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 = 𝑝𝑟
2. 𝑝𝑟
2 = 𝑝𝑟
4 (14) 
If nodes A and B participate in m authentication cycles, probability of sharing a key is: 
𝑃𝑚 = 1 − (1 − 𝑃𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠)
𝑚 (15) 
Figure 6 shows how this probability changes.  
 
Fig. 5. Different regions of network [19] 
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According to figure 6, when packet loss is lower than 0.1 after 3 cycles, the network is fully connected.  
C. Energy consumption 
Previous studies have calculated energy consumption of transmitting data, receiving data, and executing different 
cryptography primitives on Mica2dot node [18, 20]. We used the same methodology of [19, 15] for calculating energy 
consumption. In this fashion, energy consumption for receiving necessary messages were added to energy overhead for executing 
different primitives. Table III presents details of computational overhead for different PKC-based key management systems. 
 
After adding communication costs to the computation overhead of Table III total cost of i-BA becomes 60.50 mj. Table IV 
compares energy consumption of i-BA with previous works. 
 
In order to present a better insight into these numbers a simulation was carried out. We simulated networks with different 
number of nodes. Then, we calculated the amount of energy consumption for establishing a key between every node and all its 
neighbors. Figure 7 shows result of this simulation. 
 
Fig. 6. Probability of sharing a key after participating in m authentication cycles. 
TABLE III.  COMPUTATION OVERHEAD OF DIFFERENT METHODS 
Scheme Computation cost Reference  
Certificate 
Based 
CERT verify + ECDH [18]  
Hybrid Method Bloom +2 SHA1 + ECDH [15]  
Basic Method 1 SHA1+1 AES+1 HMAC + 
ECDH 
[19]  
i-BA 2 SHA1+2 AES+1 HMAC + 
ECDH 
This 
paper 
 
 
TABLE IV.  ENERGY CONSUMPTION OF DIFFERENT PKC BASED KEY 
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
Scheme Energy cost Reference 
Certificate Based 187.6 [18] 
Hybrid Method 75.26 [15] 
Basic Method 58.68 [19] 
i-BA 60.50 This paper 
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Figure 7 shows that the proposed method is more energy efficient than previous works. Also, its energy consumption is only a little 
more than BA method. 
D. Key and user revocation 
If Compromised nodes and dead nodes are not handled properly, they could become serious vulnerabilities; therefore, a secure key 
management system should address them. The proposed method needs an auxiliary mechanism for handling compromised nodes. 
For, example BS could periodically broadcast ID of newly compromised nodes. On the other hand, the proposed method has an 
inherent mechanism for addressing dead nodes. Referring to table II, nodes uses their one-time signatures for authentication. In 
other words, if a nodes runs out of signatures it can no longer participate in authentication cycles. Based on this property, nodes are 
preloaded with adequate signatures such that when their battery depletes, there is no signature left.    
E. Scalability  
To compare scalability of different PKC based key management systems, it was assumed that nodes had 64KiB of memory on 
board, ECC-160 was used and node ID was 2 bytes. Certificate based and BA methods were investigated in [19] and only IDs of 
revoked nodes should be stored. Therefore, they can support up to 32768 nodes. In the hybrid method, BS collects all public keys 
of network and constructs their Merkle hash tree. Then, BS prunes this tree into a set of smaller trees and constructs a bloom filter 
on them. Finally, nodes are preloaded with this bloom filter. Based on [15] hybrid method can support up to 15792 nodes. At last, 
the proposed method (i-BA) has the same memory characteristics as BA. Therefore, it can support up to 32768 nodes. These results 
are presented in table V. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
WSNs are deployed in hostile environments and they rely on wireless communication channel; therefore, it is essential that 
security mechanisms be employed. Many of these security mechanisms assume that a set of key are shared between nodes of 
network, a task that key management system addresses. Due to tight resource constraints, many of existing key management 
systems are based on symmetric primitives. These methods have low energy demand but, they cannot provide perfect resiliency. 
Recently, an energy efficient method based on PKC was proposed. The method used a set of one time signature instead of digital 
certificates. In this paper we showed this method is vulnerable to DOS attacks. Then, we proposed a modified version of the 
protocol that achieved immediate authentication. Through simulation we showed that the improved protocol solved its vulnerability 
to DOS attacks while it retained other desirable characteristics of initial protocol. 
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